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LAW AND RELIGION IN
AMERICA: THE NEW PICTURE
WILLIAM B.

A

BALL*

TAUGHT US, we can know nothing of the
present, without knowing the past from which the present has come.
In speaking of the church-state scene in the United States today, we
would be taking only a snapshot-and a meaningless one at thatif we were to speak of developments in 1969 solely as developments
of 1969. 1969 is mostly a prolongation of tendencies, movements and
thinking of the past. But there are some things that are new-some,
brand new, and some, mutations of older developments.

s TOYNBEE HAS SO WELL

We begin by talking about two "pasts." The first past is the old,
old American past. It is a past of Protestantism, the past so well described by Franklin Littell in his study, From State Church to Pluralism.' It is an almost unbelievable past in terms of its hostility-universal
and profound-to Catholicism. This old past has a lot to do with
church-state problems and attitudes in our country today. Its great
strength and its immense virtue lay in its Protestant Christianity, and
it leaves a great legacy of belief, faith and Christian habit to the America
of the present. It also brings to the present a vast oral tradition, transmitted from family to family, which still psychologically identifies
Catholicism as a thing both evil and, indeed, foreign.
This Protestant past, we must at once point out, is not the source
of any American tradition of church-state separation. Up until the
middle of the nineteenth century, Protestantism (except the radical
Protestant groups, such as the Amish) did not emphasize church-state
separation. Most of the colonial charters provided for Protestant establishments, and some of these establishments even survived the adoption
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1 F. LITTELL, FROM STATE CHURCH TO PLURALISM (1962).
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of the first amendment. In the first 50
years of American history, following the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, no state constitution embraced any sort of "Blaine"
amendment, and, as to the Federal Constitution, no real definition of the establishment clause was to be given by the
Supreme Court until 1947. Up to then it
had not been understood to be a clause providing for the "absolute" church-state separation, today such a fighting cause to some
people. The first half of the nineteenth
century instead showed, if anything, concerts, dependencies and unions of church
and state. The studies of Gabel2 and of
many others reveal a tlose and friendly cooperation between the Protestant churches
and the state, with all manner of public
benefits to Protestant institutions (including, in some instances, churches) deemed
proper and unquestionable. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1838 provided, in its
thirteenth article, for the use of public
funds for church-affiliated schools. Pennsylvania had few Catholics in 1838. Churchstate separation became a subject of passion in this country at precisely the time
that the Catholic immigrants became a subject of passion in this country. Massachusetts wrote the first "no aid to sectarian
schools" language into its constitution at
its 1853 convention, the membership of
which embraced few, if any, Catholics.
The Massachusetts state government at
that time, i.e., the governor, all cabinet
heads and both houses, were all members,
to a man, of the Know-Nothing Party, with

2 R. GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHILDREN AND
PRIVATE SCHOOLS (1937).
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the exception, in a 376 member legislature,
of one Whig and one Free Soiler. Following the Civil War the new vogue of absolute church-state separation mounted a
great effort to amend the Federal Constitution, in order to provide that no funds
could go to any sectarian schools. That
model of incorruptibility and public spiritedness, the Grant Administration, had
pushed hard for the federal amendment,
and was responsible for giving much increase to the support which similar amendments had in the states. The effort at the
federal level failed, but in most of the states
similar efforts succeeded. Why did the sectarian sponsors of these movements desire
to shut out sectarian schools from public
benefits? The reason was that the Catholic
schools were coming on strong, and the
common, or public schools, with their
King James Bible-reading, Protestant baccalaureate services and sectarian view of
history, were securely Protestant for the
future.
The historical fact is that the passion for
church-state separation was a very natural
development of the anti-Catholic sentiment
which had gripped generation after generation in this country since 1620. About
every 20 years from the Nativist crusades
of the mid-nineteenth century onward, we
find new movements cropping up which
revivify and give edge to the anti-Catholic
sentiment in the nation. In the second half
of the nineteenth century, the crusades for
"Blaine" amendments succeeded not only in
imposing these amendments in state constitutions but succeeded also in educating
the people to their desirability-always
against the background of what were de-
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scribed to the people as the "demands" of
the "Roman" Catholic Church in order to
get money for its "sectarian" ends. The
Catholic schools were themselves products
not only of conscientious religious preference by Catholics but were also, in a sense,
schools of refuge for immigrants who, long
after their arrival here, were subject to a
full spectrum of hostilities ranging from
active persecution to invidious discrimination in employment, housing and education.
But there existed, in addition, the movement of the American Protective Association at the end of the nineteenth century,
and then the very considerable Ku Klux
Klan movement. The Smith campaign of
1928, like the Kennedy campaign of 1960,
was the occasion for fresh outbreaks of the
deep-seated malady of anti-Catholic prejudice.
All of these tensions were, of course,
much enlivened by Catholic reactions to
Protestants and to Protestantism. AntiProtestantism became a strong thing in
many Catholics, and by the spirit of the
Counter Reformation, Catholics would undoubtedly have created Catholic-Protestant
tensions, even had the intense anti-Catholic
hostility of Protestants not existed:
So much for the first "past" which has
enormous relevance to the development of
our law today-obviously. It certainly gives
the lie to the fogged-up view of American
history preached by separationists, that
James Madison wanted "absolute" churchstate separation, and so did all the other
good folk in the country, but that when the
Catholics got here in force they really
wanted to Romanize all institutions and
make the state their servant. The opinion

of the Maryland Court of Appeals in
Horace Mann League v. Board of Public
Works, :' and the dissents in Board of
Education v. Allen,4 reveal a superb combination of the thrust of the old prejudice
mixed in with the latter nineteenth century
and Pfefferine view of church-state separation.
The second "past" is a past that began
about the year 1955, just before Vatican
II, and continued for about the next 12
years. The opening of this period was in
the reign of Good Pope John. It began, in
American intellectual circles, as a sort of
travesty on ecumenism, a kind of interfaith
opera buffa, with lawyers hogging the
main roles. Most churches-and rather
particularly the Catholic Church-did- not
believe in interfaith dialogue in those days,
and the Catholic clergy played very limited
and cautious roles in those early discussions. The National Conference of Christians and Jews was regarded by most
bishops as outside the pale, Paul Blanshard
was riding high, the Barden Bill fracas was
just in the background, and Eleanor Roosevelt was still very much in the foreground.
But there was indeed the magical effect of
Pope John, and soon the charism of John
F. Kennedy. John Courtney Murray's We
Hold These Truths5 had sudden and very
wide impact. There came the great national
conferences sponsored by Ford Foundation
and the National Conference of Christians
and Jews, the National Study Conference
of Church and State sponsored by the Na:1 242 Md. 645, 220 A.2d 51 (1966).
4 392 U.S. 236, 250 (1968)
(dissenting opinions).
JJ. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS (1960).

16

CATHOLIC

LAWYER, WINTER

1970

tional Council of Churches, and many
other meetings at which church-state issues
began to be explored by Protestant, Catholic and Jew in common. Shortly thereafter, the great Council at Rome was to
have further effect on attitudes in the
United States.

"Law-religion" relationships is better, because some of these issues involve matters
broader than the church and broader than
the state, while some do not include the
church at all.

That is the second "past," and it, too,
has bearing upon the developments we are
witnessing this year. It focused very largely
on the school aid issue, and that was its
limitation. But it also witnessed Americans
of different faiths coming together, learning
to know one another personally, and being
willing to discuss at least some of the most
sensitive of topics. Undoubtedly, that
period has created much enlightenment
which can only serve the good of the nation
and religion in the future. However, that
period seems now to have pretty much
drawn to a close. Perhaps this is because
the "parochial school aid" issue is now so
far into legislatures and courts that no
further dialogue is going to change anything. Perhaps it is because the big issues
have really been talked out and final disagreements arrived at. Or perhaps it is
because, with the publicizing of the charge
of religion's irrelevance, the issues do not
seem as important as they did to many
people in the past.

The question of aid to education in religiously affiliated schools continues to be
the most difficult and most extensive of all
law-religion problems in the nation. In this
area the force of the old, old past is at
maximum. Charges, fabrications, false information and expressions of prejudice
fashioned in the nineteenth century continue to be the ammunition with which the
Catholic position is attacked. The development of the law, however, remains essentially salutary. In June 1968, the Supreme
Court of the United States, in Board of
Education v. Allen,'; upheld, against establishment and free exercise objections, the
constitutionality of the New York State
Textbook Loan program, whereby secular
textbooks are lent to children in parochial
schools. The background of this case is very
important to examine. The briefs of the
plaintiffs and their amici curiae, e.g.,
American Jewish Congress, American Civil
Liberties Union, Anti-Defamation League
of B'nai B'rith, New York Council of
Churches, demonstrate that they concentrated on the following main points: (1)
that parochial schools are really, in legal
effect, "churches": everything that goes on
in them is religiously "permeated," and
therefore they cannot be said to perform
any kind of public function, as opposed to

At any rate, today it is well that we keep
in mind both of these "pasts." As we discuss some areas of church-state relations in
1969, we will see both of these "pasts" influence the present.
In this overview of church-state problems of the present, we will try briefly to
cover four areas. As will be seen, the term
"church-state" is a very loose use of words.

Education Aid

G 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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private religious function; (2) that, under
the five-to-four holding in Everson v. Board
of Education, 7 it is conceivable that
"health" and "welfare" services can be rendered to children attending parochial
schools, but it is clear that education of
such children cannot be publicly aided;
(3) that the test which the Supreme Court
had announced in A bington School District
v. Schempp,s (i.e., that the test of the constitutionality of the Bible-reading statute
was whether it served a secular legislative
purpose and achieved a primary effect advancing religion) could not be applied in a
case in which public funds were being used
to support education in religiously affiliated
schools.
The Supreme Court, in Allen, rejected
all three contentions, and this is a most
important point to understand about the
Allen decision. As to the first point, it declared in the clearest possible terms that
parochial schools serve public purposes and
perform public functions, as well as serving religious purposes and performing religious functions:
Underlying these cases, and underlying
also the legislative judgments that have
preceded the court decisions, has been a
recognition that private education has
played and is playing a significant and
valuable role in raising national levels of
knowledge, competence, and experience.
Americans care about the quality of the
secular education available to their children.
They have considered high quality education to be an indispensable ingredient for
achieving the kind of nation, and the kind

7 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

8 274 U.S. 203 (1963).

of citizenry, that they have desired to cre-

ate. Considering this attitude, the continued
willingness to reply on private school systems, including parochial systems, strongly
suggests that a wide segment of informed
opinion, legislative and otherwise, has found
that those schools do an acceptable job of
providing secular education to their students. This judgment is further evidence
that parochial schools are performing, in
addition to their sectarian function, the task
of secular education. '
This disposed, once and for all, of the
charge that parochial schools inevitably
and inexorably "permeate" their teaching
with religion, so that any such teaching has
nothing other than a primary effect of advancing religion.

As to the second contention, the Allen
decision rejected the notion that "welfare"
does not include education. The whole
point of the decision was that it upheld
state aid to education taking place in religiously affiliated schools. The silly attempt
of the plaintiffs, in a welfare-oriented society, whose every major leader has said
that education is welfare's top priority, to
say that the state may support the "health"
of a parochial school child but not his
mind, is absurd as well as anti-intellectual.
Professor Paul Freund, of Harvard Law
School, in a short article in the Harvard
Law Review,10 pushes this same point. Why
did the eminent Harvard Law Review publish this replay of a former speech at this
particular time, when, as enemies and
opponents of parochial school aid are well

•) 392 U.S. at 247-48.
10 Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1680 (1969).
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aware, A len will be used in test cases as
major authority? Moreover, Freund largely
misstates the facts of the Pennsylvania
Nonpublic Elementary and Secondary Education Act. The plaintiffs in the present
Pennsylvania litigation have cited Freund's
article in support of their position. This
may be one more fascinating aspect of the
great game of what some label "associational jurisprudence."
As to the third point, the Court took the
test that it had laid down in Schempp and
applied it directly to the facts of Allen. It
cannot now be doubted that this is the test
which will be followed in all subsequent
cases.
We have taken time to spell out these
three points, because they are being raised
in the new litigations which are now taking
place in the states of Pennsylvania and
Connecticut. They have absolutely no validity, but it will be very necessary, in the
structuring of defenses in these litigations,
to make sure that the courts understand
that they have no validity.
This year test litigation is seen in several
states to deny aid to parochial school children-Ohio, Pennsylvania, Connecticut and
Montana coming at once to mind. At the
same time, in 29 states, legislative efforts,
of one sort or another, are being made to
get aid for religiously affiliated education,
which is everywhere in crisis in the United
States. Defenses in these suits will be centered on Allen, though defenses based upon
equal protection and free exercise issues are
also available. It is now clear that the opponents of aid to parochial education are
going to attempt to dismiss Allen as what
the plaintiffs' brief in a recent test case
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calls a "memorandum decision." Some
memorandum decision! The position of
these and similar plaintiffs amounts essentially to an effort to achieve an overruling
of Allen through massive emphasis on ar-.
guments such as those they raised in the
New York case. We can look forward to
a period of at least two years in which
various statutory methods of achieving a
measure of state aid to the education of
children in parochial schools will be undergoing the legislative process and tests in
court. Whether any one of these-be it
purchase of service, tuition grant or other
means-is upheld in the courts will rest in
part on the quality of the briefs and advocacy on the part of counsel on both sides,
in part on the quality of the legislation so
far as its drafting is concerned, in part on
the climate of public opinion, and in part
on the objectivity of the judges.
Free Exercise
A number of problems are coming to a
head in the courts, in which the chief argument will rest on the application of the free
exercise clause. At least four free exercise areas are highly visible at the moment:
education, cultic life, tax exemption, and
conscientious objection. As previously mentioned, in connection with the defense of
the "school aid" suits, attention should be
given to the free exercise issue. It is very
clear that, in an economy in which massive
governmental welfare spending is supplanting most forms of private spending for education, and in which taxation and inflation
have risen to radical new levels, a new look
has to be taken at the free exercise clause
-and,
indeed, at the equal protection
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clause-when we come to discuss the constitutionality of programs to aid education
in religiously affiliated schools. It is very
clear that people exercise religious liberty
by sending their children to religiously affiliated schools. If that is an exercise of
religious liberty, then the state may not,
either directly or indirectly, interfere with
that exercise of religious liberty. The
manipulation of the taxing and spending
powers to deny to any person or any parent
a free educational choice based on religious
conscience-where the education sought
meets reasonable state requirements-is not
only a denial of the free exercise of religion
and of the equal protection of the laws but
indeed may be viewed as a taking of property, through taxation, without due process
of law. These constitutional positions are
now in the exploratory stage, but it is not
unlikely that they will be advanced as elements in the defense of some of the current litigations.
A very important problem of free exercise is posed by the plight of the Amish
people in Wisconsin and of Mennonite and
Amish people in several other states, one
of these being in the criminal prosecution
against Amish farmers in Wisconsin in the
case of Wisconsin v. Yoder." Involved is
an important tenet of Amish belief that
children not attend high school-whether
it be an Amish high school or a public high
school. This is an emanation from the
Amish beliefs respecting adult baptism and
separation from the world. The state of

It Nos. 5455, 5456, 5457 (Green County Cir.
Ct., Nov. 13, 1969), appeal docketed, (Wis. Sup.

Ct., Feb. 5, 1970; renumbered No. State 170,
171, 1969 Term).

Wisconsin has brought criminal complaints
against three Amish farmers who have refused to send their children to high school
-indeed in a situation in which the only
high school available is a public high
school. The defense is built precisely on the
doctrine announced by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Sherbert v. Verner 12 in 1963. There the Court, quoting
from its opinion in Thomas v. Collins,"
said that, while the state may interfere with
the exercise of religious liberty, it may do
so only under extraordinary circumstances:
"Only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.' 1 4 At the trial, a great
deal of testimony from public officials was
produced which showed that the Amish in
Wisconsin have in no manner constituted
any danger whatever to the state. Evidence
from the sheriff was also produced that
the Amish had committed no crime in the
area and testimony from the County Director of Social Services that they do not
produce any burdens to the public in terms
of indigency or delinquency. An important
question is whether the state has met its
burden of proof in this case showing that
the Amish, in keeping their children out of
high school, have presented any danger
whatever to the community. This is a
straight case of religious liberty which
likely will eventually be settled by the
Supreme Court of the United States, if
necessary, so that these good people will
be protected in such exercise of religious
liberty. Obviously, this case has implica-

374 U.S. 398 (1963).
VI 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
14 374 U.S. at 406.
12
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tions respecting other minority religious
groups, some of which have very little protection. For example, the Anabaptist groups
are practically the only Protestant groups
in the country which have ever really adhered to the principle of church-state separation. These people want to be apart
from the state and society and live Christian lives as they believe Christ desired
them to live. We will know a lot more
about the true nature of our society when
we see how these cases are decided. Undoubtedly, LSD religions, snake cults and
other off-beat groups, which claim to be
religions will seek the protection of a
successful ruling, should it be achieved, in
the Amish case. Each such case can certainly be decided on its merits as it arises.
A second important free exercise area,
then, will very possibly pertain to the avant
garde religious groups. We have referred
briefly to the old radical religious groups,
but not too far from them in some respects
will be the new American cults with new
forms of worship, or new core concepts of
conduct. These groups will not necessarily
be theistic religious groups. There has been
some publicity of late concerning the
growth of so-called "civil religion" among
the young. These religious groups will undoubtedly be able to claim status as religions due to the effect of the Supreme
5
Court's decision in Torcaso v. Watkins,'
in which the Court defined the term "religion," as used in the first amendment, to
include other than theistic religionsspecifically mentioning secular humanism,
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ethical culture, Buddhism and Taoism. It
is very clear that, under Supreme Court
decisions, to claim religious liberty, one
need not belong to an organized body or
express theistic religious concepts. The term
"religion" is one of very great latitude, and
that must be kept in clear focus as we think
of the "hippie" type religions, the older
Pentacostal groups and, indeed, the education afforded in the public schools. Constitutionally, "religion" means nothing other
than one's value-holdings. And, remembering that, we must not forget the establishment clause. In a free society, secular
humanist values of the state may no more
be imposed through the use of tax-raised
funds than can any other religious values.
And that is something to contemplate as
state after state is moving in the direction
of state imposed sex education.
A third free exercise area relates to tax
exemption. Walz v. Tax Commission of the
City of New York1" has now been taken
up for review by the Supreme Court of the
United States. In that case the plaintiff has
alleged that the Real Property Tax Law of
the State of New York, and the provision
of the New York Constitution which gives
rise to the exemption statute, violate the
first and fourteenth amendments of the
Federal Constitution. Plaintiff has further
alleged that he pays a real property tax and
is a religious person though not a member
of a religious organization. He contends
that the law in question forces him to make
contributions to organized religions. If the

16 24 N.Y.2d 30, 246 N.E.2d 517, 298 N.Y.S.2d

35 367 U.S. 488 (1961).

711 (1969).
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Supreme Court goes ahead and actually
renders a decision in the Walz case, and if
that decision is in favor of the plaintiff, the
implications for churches in the United
States will be tremendous. It is to be hoped
that the defense of this case will be rested
solidly on the free exercise clause. The
theory here should be that there can be no
exercise of religion in any form in which it
now has clearly vested rights, without tax
exemption of places of religious worship.
It would be vain to rest the defense against
the claims made by Walz on defenses appropriate to suits in which public aid to the
achieving of public objectives through
religiously affiliated institutions is contested.
There is an enormous constitutional difference between any form of tax support to
public objectives achieved by private institutions and the matter of exemption from
taxation. The two are not unrelated, but
they are different. Without attempting here
to go over the whole ground of the Walz
case, it is enough to say that a new legal
chapter relating to the field of tax exemption
is unfolding. This is evident in the revisions
being made in the constitutions of several
states, the broadening of the taxing power
of the states and the narrowing of historical
areas of tax exemption for churches.
Finally, we should consider briefly the
subject of conscientious objection. Again,
we are faced with profound questions relating to free exercise and the definition of
religion. The recent opinion of Judge
Wyzanski in United States v. Sisson 1 7 is
most important. Here the court arrested

judgment on a jury's conviction and ruled
in favor of a non-religious conscientious
objector, on first ameiidment grounds,
stating:
When the state through its laws seeks to
override reasonable moral commitments
it makes a dangerously uncharacteristic
choice. The law grows from the deposits
of morality. . . .When the law treats a
reasonable, conscientious act as a crime it
subverts its own power. . . .It impairs the
very habits which nourish and preserve the
law.' 8
Here is a very interesting development relating to the definition of religion.
Censorship-Public Morality
A third area which we should briefly
examine is that of censorship. This is
another famous old law-religion battleground, but the battleground is just about
empty. Sheriffs, bishops, judges and legislators have all taken flight since the decisions of the Supreme Court in such recent
cases as that involving "Fanny Hill." 19
Even the victors have walked off the field,
there bing nothing left against which to
lead a charge. Decency groups will soon be
pleading that we bring back suggestive
literature or good old movies like "The
Moon Is Blue" or "The Miracle." Pornography is nowhere because it is everywhere.
It has lost all status. The American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) has gotten its

18 Id. at 910-11.
19 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of

a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
17 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).

413 (1966).
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wish, or rather, the American people have
gotten ACLU's wish. This is not the freedom to see what one wants to see, not the
much vaunted "freedom to know," not the
crusader's "freedom to read"-but the unleashing of the full panoply of financial
power to blind the people. It is financial
power which is the amazingly unnoticed
but absolutely dominant factor in a deliberate remaking of the attitudes of the people
toward sex (and thus toward human life).
Almost any book review section of the
Sunday New York Times provides a stunning example of this. The theatre of grace,
rationality, perception and wit is going
dark and, coming on, bright and garish, in
its place, is the Roman Theatre-no theatre
at all but a place of blood and cruel exploitation of the human body. "We can't
legislate morality," muse the dotty old ladies
of the ACLU as they behold commercial
power doing worse evils to children than
did industrial power of a century ago. The
recent decision of the Supreme Court, upholding the constitutionality of age classification,21 has evidently had no effect
whatever. The public is careless with its
future, and it has no concern over this
abuse of financial power.
This leads us to discuss another area of
the life of the state in which the church
has always had an active interest, the area
of sexual morality. The slogan here (which
is now starting to move legislatures and
will soon be featured in briefs of lawyers
in court) is that religious groups should
not-for example, in opposing infanticide
-"impose their morality" on others. That

Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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is to say, that clergymen and other churchmen, as well as those who believe in nonbelief, may-in the name of their personal
moral convictions-urge putting pressures
on legislators to legislate an end to capital
punishment, in favor of every woman's
"right" to an abortion, and against bingo,
booze and horses, but that these are not
to be considered "imposing one's morality."
Rather, this is merely the "free expression
of opinion in a democracy," the merely
"forthright expression of concerned citizens
standing up to be counted."
The Right to Life
The trend of recent decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States is
emphatically in favor of protecting the
right to life. For 30 years we have seen
this in the area of those decisions which
dealt with such subjects as the power of the
Government to protect women and children
under sound labor laws and in many decisions affecting the working man in his right
to earn a decent living. We see also the
great evolution of decisions at long last
vindicating, in so many areas, the human
rights of Negroes. Most recently there have
been extremely important Supreme Court
decisions relating to the right of racial intermarriage, 21 the right to basic education
without racial discrimination, -'2 and voting
rights for Blacks. 2" There was the great
decision upholding open housing in Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,24 and we have

21

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430
(1968).
"3 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
.24 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
22

20
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seen, all the while, the vigilance of federal
courts throughout the country in assuring
that desegregation orders are carried out
with respect to school districts. Closely
related to the right to life, not only of black
people but of poor people everywhere in
the country, has been the development of
the criminal law in the areas of due process
and equal protection. While there has been
a great hue and cry against the Supreme
Court on account of its decisions in the area
of criminal due process, there can be no
doubt that, taken as a whole, these decisions are protective of the rights of individuals helpless against the state. Conversely, the administration of the criminal
law has been rendered far more difficult
by these decisions, but when put in clear
focus-and removed from expressions of
left wing hysteria against so-called "police
brutality"-the decisions withstand analysis, if it is fairness to individuals that
we have in mind. We must also consider
the growing concern of the Supreme Court
over the right of privacy-a right which
becomes more important each day in an
increasingly socialized society. While some
criticism has been expressed concerning the
Connecticut birth control case, Griswold v.
Connecticut,2 5 this decision, even with its
multiple and discordant opinions, shows an
active and earnest concern on the part of
the Court to protect the privacy of marriage
and family.
In another area of the "right to life,"
serious trouble imminently threatens.
Closely related to commercially changed
attitudes respecting sex (and reflected in

25 381,U.S. 479 (1965).

literature and on the stage) are the movements in favor of so-called "liberalized"
abortion laws and the movement for population control. Just as the abortion movement is being carried on a wave of false
propaganda-but very widespread and intensive-so the movement for population
control is being similarly carried forward.
As constitutionalists, we must take particular note of the fact that the population
control movement is aimed precisely at
control. Let there be no doubt about that.
The general theory which lies behind this
movement may be expressed as follows:
"Voluntary, if voluntary works-otherwise
coercion." It is regrettable that this entire
issue, several years ago, was confused with
the issue of the morality, under Catholic
teaching, of birth control. The issues are
very distinct and have nothing to do with
each other. The questions to be raised about
population control are not constitutionally
different (except for their being infinitely
more serious) than questions which might
be raised about price control, flood control,
or any other known form of governmental
control of some form of human activity.
The only aspect of Catholic doctrine affecting this question is the question of due
process of law. But when we begin to talk
about the use of governmental power actively to promote anything in the area of
human conduct, we are approaching the
edge of constitutional questions. Where
governmental promotion is actively used
in order to induce human beings to cease
from procreating, can anyone doubt that
we are into a constitutional problem of
great magnitude? Up to now the going
slogan concerning governmental "family
planning" programs has been that it is
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merely "to afford badly needed health
services to those who need them and can't
afford to pay for them." However, how
could this possibly become a program which
would ever head off the assumed population explosion? All of the hearings before
the congressional committees revealed that
the poor, to whom these programs are
beamed, do not usually elect to "avail"
themselves of the services offered. And
that accounts for the fact that recently,
President Nixon's chief advisors on population have been counseling coercive
measures. They have talked in terms of tax
penalties and very serious civil disabilities
to those who refuse to limit their families in
accordance with the state's wishes. While
the population control movement is now in
high gear and at last has the full backing
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of a national administration, it is not so
much as being questioned by people who
are interested in civil liberties. We can only
hope that a public questioning of the movement will develop, and if that is so, then
we can feel certain that test litigation can
likewise be developed whereby to vindicate
-before
it is too late-natural rights of
human beings in one of the most vital areas
of human life.
This has been the briefest of overviews,
touching upon some of the problems, a
few of the statutes and some of the cases
in which law and religion meet on the
American scene at the present time. We
think that the law can continue to perform
one of the important functions which St.
Thomas Aquinas ascribed to it-that of
education.

